![\"Matthew](\"http:\/\/www.matthewvandyke.com\/images\/matthew-vandyke-tuareg-tagelmust-blue-turban-veil-sahara-desert.jpg\" "\\"Matthew")
<\/a>Matthew VanDyke\u00a0wearing a Tuareg tagelmust in the Sahara desert<\/p><\/div>\n
I admittedly had some mixed feelings when deciding whether to write about the Tuareg rebellion because of my experience as a freedom fighter in the Libyan civil war<\/a>.\u00a0 Thousands of Tuaregs\u00a0were serving in Muammar Gaddafi’s army during the Libyan civil war and others went to Libya as mercenaries to join them.\u00a0 If I had encountered any of them on the battlefield they would have been in my crosshairs like any other Gaddafi fighter.<\/p>\n But I never saw\u00a0a Tuareg\u00a0during the war and with good reason.\u00a0 Most had already fled back to Mali before I escaped from prison<\/a> and returned to the front lines.\u00a0 They weren\u2019t Gaddafi loyalists, they were Gaddafi opportunists \u2013 they came for money \u2013 and while I consider this even more deplorable than actually believing in Gaddafi and being a true loyalist, it at least suggests that their participation in the Libyan civil war was morally but not ideologically corrupt.<\/p>\n The Tuareg desire for self-determination cannot be dismissed despite the desire of many to do so for the past hundred years. \u00a0This is a conflict that has been ongoing since 1962 and is just the latest of four Taureg rebellions in Mali.\u00a0 The Tuareg, the fabled Blue Men of the Desert<\/em>, have demonstrated repeatedly that they won\u2019t disappear quietly into the Sahara.<\/p>\n The current Tuareg rebellion, by far the most organized, equipped, and successful of them all, has given the Tuaregs the best opportunity for self-determination that they have ever had.\u00a0 They\u00a0may never be in this position again, flush with arms and ammunition and their ranks dominated by veteran fighters returning from war in a neighboring country.\u00a0 The military wing of the movement, the National Movement for the Liberation\u00a0of Azawad(MNLA), has learned the mistakes of past Tuareg rebellions and will not repeat them.\u00a0 This time they have also learned some lessons of the Arab Spring<\/a>\u00a0and are supported by a virtual army of Tuareg activists around the world who use social media to communicate, coordinate, and propagandize the conflict to carry it far beyond the sands of the Sahara.<\/p>\n Azawad Calling<\/p>\n The Tuareg want to establish their own country, Azawad, in northern Mali.\u00a0 Their traditional homeland in the Sahara was carved apart by the French during the Scramble for Africa and divided among Mali, Niger and Algeria, all of whose borders were carefully drawn by France to pursue its own interests in Africa.\u00a0 The Tuareg of Mali, a nomadic desert people, were lumped into a country twice the size of France and quickly fell under the dominance of their former slaves, the black Africans living in tropical Mali south of the Niger River.\u00a0 Like many of the colonial borders drawn in Africa, the Middle East, and Asia by European powers in the 19th<\/sup> and 20th<\/sup> centuries during the period of New Imperialism\u00a0Mali was destined for perpetual strife.<\/p>\n Unlike many other intrastate conflicts, the Tuareg aren\u2019t fighting for resources or valuable land.\u00a0 The conflict is primarily ideological, a matter of cultural pride\u00a0to a people with simple needs and interests.\u00a0 Mali is already one of the poorest countries in the world and Azawad\u00a0would be even poorer, at least for the first several years.\u00a0 However,\u00a0the geology of\u00a0the Taoudeni\u00a0Basin in northern Mali suggests that significant oil and gas reserves may lay beneath the sand.\u00a0 Companies have been unable to conduct adequate surveys of the area due to poor security in the region, but there is little doubt that there is enough oil to allow Azawad to survive as an independent nation.\u00a0 Cynical observers with no sense of history have suggested that those oil reserves are behind the current rebellion, an argument that doesn’t stand when one considers that the Tuareg have been fighting for independence in Mali for 50 years.<\/p>\n Resistance by the West, Mali, and its Neighbors<\/p>\n The arguments in favor of preserving Mali\u2019s territorial integrity at the expense of the Tuaregs are difficult to justify.\u00a0 The West\u2019s primary interest in Mali is fighting Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and preserving Mali\u2019s 20 year history as a democratic country and stabilizing force in West Africa.\u00a0 Mali is active in several programs, initiatives, and organizations in the region and has been a valued and reliable partner of the West.\u00a0 The US and EU are also concerned that unrest in Mali could spread and that a lack of central authority in the Azawad region\u00a0could lead to a safe haven for Al Qaeda as existed in Afghanistan prior to 2001.<\/p>\n Algeria and Niger believe that the creation of Azawad\u00a0would incite Taureg rebellions in their own countries (and in the case of Algeria, perhaps a Tuareg-inspired Berber rebellion as well).\u00a0 This is similar to the arguments made by Turkey and Iran<\/a> about Kurdish independence \u2013 that it would inspire the Kurds in their own countries to also seek independence.\u00a0\u00a0Like Turkey and Iran, Algeria and Niger\u00a0will do everything they can to crush the aspirations for self-determination in a neighboring country in the pursuit of crushing\u00a0them at home.<\/p>\n The government of Mali is panicked, despite enjoying the overwhelming support of non-Tuareg Malians (and a limited number of Tuaregs as well).\u00a0 The Tuareg rebellion has been so successful that it prompted a coup d\u2019etat by military officers desperate to stop it, ending 20 years of\u00a0democracy in Mali.\u00a0 The Malian government and most of its citizens believe that preserving their multi-ethnic, territorially vast, democratic country is in the best interest of everyone.\u00a0 They also don\u2019t want to lose whatever natural resources\u00a0might lay hidden beneath the sands of northern Mali.<\/p>\n Intelligence and Policy Failure<\/p>\n The scandal in all of this was that the Tuareg insurgency of 2012 was entirely predictable and could have been prevented by Mali and its allies.\u00a0 Tuareg fighters were able to haul a massive arsenal of weapons and ammunition over a thousand miles from Libya to Mali, through Algeria or Niger, without interference by Mali\u2019s allies in the West, Algeria, or the Malian government.\u00a0 It was an extraordinary display\u00a0of incompetence by all\u00a0involved.<\/p>\n That a Tuareg insurgency would follow the Libyan civil war was entirely predictable.\u00a0 The Mali civil war (1990-96) was begun by Tuareg fighters supported by Libya, including Tauregs\u00a0who returned to Mali after serving Gaddafi in his war against Chad.\u00a0 A veteran of the civil war, \u00a0Ag Bahanga,\u00a0led the failed 2006 uprising and was forced to flee to Libya in 2009.\u00a0 He became a close confident of Muammar\u00a0Gaddafi.\u00a0 Another Tuareg leader, Mohammed Ag Najm, became a commander of one of Gaddafi\u2019s elite desert units, and many Tuaregs enlisted in the Libyan army.<\/p>\n Bahanga\u00a0and\u00a0Najm\u00a0waited for their opportunity to act.\u00a0 Once the\u00a0Libyan civil war began to turn against Gaddafi\u00a0in early summer 2011 Bahanga\u00a0and Najm\u00a0led the Tuaregs to\u00a0raid the arms depots and then headed southwest back to Mali.\u00a0 They were in command of elite desert units that had the men, equipment, and knowledge of the desert necessary to transport their massive stockpile of weapons over a thousand miles through three countries.\u00a0 It was a time-consuming and difficult operation that allegedly took several trips over a period of months and is rumored to have had the consent of the Libyan rebel government (the NTC) because it reduced Gaddafi’s arsenal and took Tuaregs off the battlefield.<\/p>\n The United States clearly had an interest in preventing this through either direct action or by\u00a0coordinating with the Algerian or Niger\u00a0authorities to stop it, especially since Bahanga and Najm\u2019s arsenal may have included surface to air missiles.<\/p>\n Once again the US intelligence community has dropped the ball despite overwhelming technology and funding simply because they lacked the ability to think a few steps ahead and have the wrong people (with the wrong type of experience) working as analysts.<\/p>\n What happens next?<\/p>\n This time the proverbial genie is out of the bottle and it isn\u2019t getting put back.\u00a0 The Mali government strategy, if one can call it that, appears limited to waiting for the Tuaregs to run out of ammunition.\u00a0 This is unlikely to happen anytime soon as the MNLA will successfully negotiate for the surrender of towns and garrisons as they proceed south and capture the weapons left behind.\u00a0 Tuareg\u00a0soldiers from the Malian army have also defected to the rebels bringing with them vehicles, weapons, and ammunition.<\/p>\n The coup d\u2019etat, intended by the conspirators to better enable the military to crush the rebellion, will at least for now have the opposite effect.\u00a0 The government is weaker than ever, which will hurt the morale of government forces and lead to more surrenders and defections from army ranks.<\/p>\n Years of cooperation between the US and Malian government are going down the drain and analysts are typing away on their keyboards generating assessments of what the latest Tuareg rebellion means to the United States and the War on Terrorism.\u00a0 A determination will likely be made that short-term regional stability trumps all other concerns, as usual; even the right to self-determination which is\u00a0part of our national ethos<\/a>.<\/p>\n The State Department will frantically start pulling the levers of diplomacy to find a negotiated solution to end the conflict \u2013 a negotiated solution that will certainly not allow for the creation of Azawad\u00a0as a new country.\u00a0 The US military\u00a0may even cooperate with the Malian military to crush the rebellion which will do far more than anything to push Tuaregs, who have historically shown little affinity for AQIM, straight to their neighborhood jihadi recruitment office.<\/p>\n Red, White, and Blue Men<\/em> of the Desert?<\/p>\n The current situation presents a historic opportunity for the United States.\u00a0 The coup d\u2019etat was counterintuitively\u00a0fortuitous by giving the US government an excuse to withhold support for the Malian government.\u00a0 This will provide more time to assess the situation, avoid angering the Tuaregs, lessen AQIM\u2019s ability to capitalize on the insurgency with propaganda against the West, send the message that coup d\u2019etats against democratic governments will not\u00a0be tolerated, help the US walk the fine line of not angering Algeria and Niger, and most importantly allow the Tuaregs to achieve their goal of establishing Azawad.<\/p>\n How is the creation of Azawad\u00a0possibly in the interest of the United States?\u00a0 The time to stop this from happening was when Bahanga\u00a0and Najm set off from Libya. \u00a0Tracking their movements and having the Algerians stop them, or alternatively, making sure those convoys mysteriously disappeared in the desert with nothing but charred, smoking wrecks of vehicles left behind, would have solved this before it started.\u00a0 Now, it is too late.<\/p>\n Within the next few weeks Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu will fall to the Tuaregs.\u00a0 With the acquisition of the three capitals of the three regions that will compose Azawad\u00a0the territorial aspirations of the Tuaregs will be largely complete.\u00a0 Entrenched in favorable terrain and enjoying the support of the local population, the Tuaregs can defend Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu against\u00a0any counter-offensive by Mali\u2019s small army of 7,000 (now likely\u00a0only 4,500 if estimates of\u00a0casualties and desertions are accurate).<\/p>\n The war\u00a0is\u00a0lost.<\/p>\n If policymakers in Washington have learned anything from the Arab Spring (and they appear to be learning, slowly) they should realize this and will soon begin tapping every connection they have with the Tuaregs to convince them to stop at the Niger River, to negotiate a ceasefire with Mali, and to guide the Tuareg leadership towards democracy, self-governance, and further cooperation with the US against AQIM in exchange for political and economic support.\u00a0 They’ll push for\u00a0the federal solution to the conflict that grants the Tuaregs semi-autonomy over northern Mali, which might not be acceptable to either side.\u00a0 The Tuaregs\u00a0have been burned before by the Malian government refusing to honor the terms of previous agreements.<\/p>\n The US government will be reluctant to support the creation of Azawad\u00a0as a new country.\u00a0 Those working at the State Department, Pentagon, and the intelligence agencies have\u00a0never understood this part of the world, as revealed by Wikileaks\u00a0documents on Mali.\u00a0 A career\u00a0government analyst\u00a0will have a hard time wrapping his head around how dispersed desert nomads would be better partners in the fight against AQIM than the government of Mali.<\/p>\n The\u00a0reason why should be obvious even to those who haven’t spent time among the people of the Sahara.\u00a0 Mali has never had any real control over the Azawad\u00a0territories.\u00a0 The Tuaregs are culturally, racially, and politically foreign to the central government, and the Sahara is hostile territory to the vast majority of Malians.\u00a0 They have never been able to tame it, understand it, or function in it.\u00a0\u00a0Mali was never going to be a truly\u00a0effective partner against AQIM.<\/p>\n Azawad, on the other hand, will be.\u00a0 Nobody knows the desert better than the Tuaregs.\u00a0 They have lived there for two thousand years, know every route and every track in the desert, are connected by tribal and family ties that make it impossible\u00a0for someone to join AQIM\u00a0without others knowing, and most importantly have shown little desire for either radical Islam or terrorism in the past.\u00a0 The MNLA\u00a0has made it very clear that they intend to create a secular, democratic state. With no history of radical Islamism, the majority of Tuaregs opposed to the imposition of sharia law,\u00a0and a matrilineal society that respects the rights of women, there is no reason to doubt their intentions.<\/p>\n Most importantly for the United States, the Tuareg\u00a0are the only people who can effectively police that region of the world, and since the Tuaregs are dispersed over\u00a05+ nations their reach and potential as a partner in the War on Terrorism should not be underestimated.<\/p>\n The Sahara is their sandbox, and they know everyone who plays in it.<\/p>\n Fighting AQIM\u00a0is the only significant strategic interest the United States has in this fight, other than maintaining good relations with Algeria and Niger or preventing instability from spreading beyond Mali\u2019s borders.\u00a0 Every effort should be made to reach out to the Tuaregs and gain influence and favor with them to ensure that the United States has influence in Azawad when this war is over.<\/p>\n It won’t be easy.\u00a0 The Tuareg are fiercely proud and independent.\u00a0 Whatever we do they won’t ever love us – they even fight among themselves.\u00a0 They’ll always\u00a0question our intentions and the Sahara is notorious for conspiracy theories that will only bolster their suspicions.\u00a0 However, the Tuareg relationship with Gaddafi should serve as a model for a US-Azawad relationship.<\/p>\n The Tuareg\u00a0can be bought.\u00a0 They have replaced their ancient camel caravans transporting salt across the Sahara with Toyota pickup trucks smuggling cocaine, weapons, and migrants.\u00a0 They’ve been involved in kidnapping foreigners for sale or ransom.\u00a0 Corruption and criminality have spread among the Tuaregs as the Mali and Niger governments have failed to integrate them into modernity and the rest of society.\u00a0 When Gaddafi stepped into this void by funding development projects, employing Tuaregs in his armed forces, declaring support for a Tuareg state, and identifying himself with the Tuareg by sleeping\u00a0in tents and various other displays of tacky showmanship,\u00a0the people loved him for it.<\/p>\n Therein lies an opportunity for the United States.\u00a0 Obama doesn’t need to sleep in a tent, but\u00a0supporting the Tuareg’s Azawad aspirations would go a long way if accompanied by economic development projects.\u00a0 Stepping into the void left by the removal of Gaddafi would position the United States to have real influence in the region and monitor a part of the world that is often obscured in darkness.<\/p>\n This might be achievable through the likely\u00a0outcome of this war: the federal solution of Tuareg semi-autonomy in Azawad, while remaining part of Mali.\u00a0 This would resemble the situation of Kurdistan in Iraq and might satisfy enough Tuaregs to take the steam out of their rebellion.\u00a0 Regardless of whether the Tuaregs achieve semi-autonomy or independence (and one of these outcomes will be the result of this successful rebellion) the United States must position itself as a friend of the Tuaregs and aggressively support the region with aid and development to buy the support of the people.<\/p>\n The United States cannot risk Azawad\u00a0resembling Afghanistan pre-2001, where\u00a0American reach was so limited that Al Qaeda was able to operate with impunity.\u00a0 If\u00a0the US\u00a0reaches out to the Tuaregs now\u00a0we will gain influence over the\u00a0emerging Azawad government\u00a0and create bonds that could be among our most significant victories in the fight against Al Qaeda.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"excerpt":{"rendered":" The Tuareg Rebellion in Mali (also available in French here) I admittedly had some mixed feelings when deciding whether to write about the Tuareg rebellion because of my experience as a freedom fighter in the Libyan civil war.\u00a0 Thousands of … Continue reading